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EQUAL PROTECTION MISAPPLIED: THE POLITICS OF
GENDER AND LEGITIMACY AND THE DENIAL OF
INHERITANCE
LINDA KELLY HILL*
INTRODUCTION
Does nature or nurture define a parent-child relationship? What
is the relevance of a child's legitimacy or a parent's gender? In the in-
heritance context, the states' answers to these questions are critical.
When an individual dies without a will or certain property has not
been devised, a state's intestate provisions dictate how to distribute
such property. Aspiring to reflect the "presumed desires" of the de-
cedent, the intestate provisions proportion a decedent's estate to
surviving family members based on a priority scheme designed to
approximate the significance of familial relations.1 Such normative
judgements raise difficult constitutional questions.
In defining the parent-child relationship, the inheritance con-
troversy centers around the role of the unwed father. In order to
inherit, an unwed father who survives his child may be expected to
demonstrate that he supported such child during his minority.2 Like-
wise, a child who survives her unwed father may be held to a unique
standard in order to qualify as a rightful "heir-at-law."3 Although
provisions drawing such distinctions are challenged on the basis of
gender and legitimacy, the Supreme Court fails to provide any uni-
form guidance. Instead, the Court either ignores the challenges or
responds inconsistently.4
In reviewing the claims brought by surviving unwed fathers,
the Supreme Court has equivocated, at times recognizing a gender
* M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis.
J.D., 1992, University of Virginia; B.A., 1988, University of Virginia.
1. In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Minn. 1970). For an overview of
intestate considerations and the priority scheme offered by the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC) see JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRuSTS, AND ESTATES 59-64 (3d ed. 2005).
2. For a discussion of the states that unilaterally place such demands on unwed
fathers see infra note 21 and accompanying text. For the recognition and support of
intestate schemes that equally place such support expectation on all parents, regardless
of gender or legitimacy, see infra notes 27-29, 203-04 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the states' evidentiary standards for establishing a parent-
child relationship between a surviving unwed child and his father see infra notes 14-21
and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 41-48, 58-79 and accompanying text.
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claim and on other occasions relying on legitimacy.5 By contrast,
claims raised by surviving nonmarital children are strictly relegated
to a review based upon legitimacy.' Consequently, the two stan-
dards of review are inconsistent, despite children and fathers having
identical inheritance interests. This problem is exacerbated by the
diverging constitutional standards of review for gender and legiti-
macy produced by United States v. Virginia.' Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court's misapplications of equal protection reverberate in
state probate decisions.
While biases held against unwed fathers are central to such short-
comings, other problems also prevent a fair evaluation of state inte-
state schemes. In the rare case when there is consensus as to whether
an intestate provision raises gender or legitimacy issues, the inability
to standardize the means-ends fit for gender or legitimacy allows in-
consistent results to persist.8
Notwithstanding the misapplication of equal protection, the
judicial evaluation of intestacy also fails by assuming the perspec-
tive of the beneficiary. Although intestate schemes are meant to
reflect the intent of the decedent, challenges to such schemes are
traditionally considered from the perspective of the surviving relation.9
By ignoring the intestate's interest in how his estate is distributed,
the right of inheritance is denied.
This article addresses how constitutional inconsistencies and
political biases skew the definitions of parent and child in intestacy.
Part I surveys the states' intestate provisions and explains how the
varying definitions of parent and child carry terrific consequences
for unwed fathers, their children, and other relations. After detail-
ing in Part II how the equal protection review afforded to unwed
fathers and children fails, Part III holds both politics and theory
accountable. Such crisis is aggravated by the recognition in Part IV
that constitutional claims to intestacy have not been properly oriented
toward the rights of the decedent. Given the gamut of difficulties,
Part V advances a twofold proposal capable of achieving greater con-
stitutional accuracy and integrity in inheritance. Finally, Part VI
applies such prescription in the hopes of demonstrating a consistent
standard which fairly treats both sides in the nature-nurture debate.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
7. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). For the problems raised by
this distinction see infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 138-73 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
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I. THE STATUTES
A. The Significance of the Parent-Child Relationship
Because the parent-child relationship is the linchpin to estab-
lishing numerous familial relations, constitutional questions of gender
and legitimacy often arise when a child has been born out-of-wedlock
and intestate shares are at stake. Such questions obviously arise in
cases in which a surviving parent wishes to inherit "from" a deceased
child and in cases in which a surviving child wishes to inherit "from"
a deceased father. However, satisfying the legal definition of a parent-
child relationship also establishes a relationship between the family
relations of the father and those of the child. Consequently, a surviv-
ing father or a surviving child may also inherit "through" the estab-
lished parent-child relationship, thereby reaching the estates of other
now legally recognized relations.° The parent-child relationship also
qualifies other surviving family members of the father or child as
"heirs-at-law."" Such heirs also become eligible to receive an intes-
tate share "from or through" the parent or child.2 Consequently, the
existence of a legal parent-child relationship between an unwed child
and his father is critical to many individuals. The states rely on
various standards to establish a relationship. In recognizing such
relations, however, the states also make a common distinction based
upon whether it is the father or the child who has died intestate. 3
B. Inheritance "From or Through" the Unwed Father by the Child
or Child's Kindred
In order for the out-of-wedlock child or child's kindred to inherit
"from or through" his deceased father, paternity must be established. 4
10. For an excellent discussion of the potential of establishing a parent-child relation-
ship in order to inherit "from and through" one's relations and how such potential may
double in the case of adoption see, e.g., Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1988).
11. See infra notes 14-29 (summarizing state statutory standards)
12. Id.
13. In the event it is a member of the father's family or the child's family who has
died intestate, the state will also typically consider how the parent-child link factors into
forging the relationship between the interested survivor and decedent in order to deter-
mine whether the survivor needs to meet the parent-child standard established for the
child or the parent. See infra notes 14-29 (summarizing state statutory standards).
14. Significantly, Louisiana's proof of "acknowledgment!' or "fihiation" is gender neutral.
In the event the illegitimate child wants to be recognized either as a child of his mother
or father, the same standard must be met. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209 (West 2005). For
further discussion of the states' use of gender neutral standards see infra notes 27-57
and accompanying text.
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States are typically satisfied that the parent-child relationship has
been established prior to the father's death by such events as the
father's marriage to the mother after the child is born,"5 adoption, 6
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity'" or a legal adjudication of
paternity.'" In addition, most states also allow paternity to be
15. In addition to recognizing a child born after a marriage (or after entering a void
marriage) as presumptively the husband's child, a child born prior to a marriage (or after
entering a void marriage) is often presumed to be the husband's child if a marriage
occurs within three hundred days of the child's birth. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-11-114 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-114 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-11-5 (2006).
Paternity may also be established when the natural father marries (or enters into a
void marriage) the natural mother anytime after the child is born. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 43-8-48 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-438 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 508 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109
(West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2) (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§474.060.2 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (2) (LexisNexis 2006) (only valid
marriages); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051 (LexisNexis 2006) (only valid marriages);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:4 (2004) (only valid marriages); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107
(West 2006) (only valid marriages); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114 (2004) (only valid
marriages); TENN. CODEANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (West 2006); VA. CODEANN. § 64.1-5.1
(West 2006).
16. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(iii) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 561:4 (2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 2003).
17. For a sampling of the variety of voluntary acknowledgment standards see e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105 (West 2006) (acknowledgment in writing filed with
court or relevant state agency); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-4 (Lexisnexis 2006)
(acknowledgment in writing filed with court or relevant state agency); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45a-438(b) (West 2006) (writing); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 2006) (writing
under oath); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2 (West 2006) (acknowledgment); IND. CODE
ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (West 2006) (affidavit); LA. CIv. CODE art. 203, 209 (2005) (acknowl-
edgment before notary and two witnesses or by signing birth certificate); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 190 § 7 (West 2006) (acknowledgment); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
700.2114 (LexisNexis 2005) (acknowledgment or signing birth certification); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.55 (West 2006) (acknowledgment or consent to being named on birth
certificate); MONT. CODE ANN. §40-6-105 (2004) (acknowledgment or consent to being
named on birth certificate); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:4 (West 2006) (acknowledgment);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5- 10 (West 2006) (signing birth certificate); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-
114 (West 2006) (acknowledgment or consent to being named on birth certificate); N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (West 2006) (acknowledgment); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-10 (West 2006) (acknowledgment in writing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 301-04-09 (2005)
(acknowledgment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 2006) (acknowledgment before
witnesses); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.105(2) (West 2006) (acknowledgment); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 33-1-8 (LexisNexis 2006) (marriage and acknowledgment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 29A-2-114 (2006) (written acknowledgment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 (2005)
(acknowledgment); W.VA. ANN. CODE § 42-1-5(a) (Lexis 2006) (acknowledgment);
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 2006) (acknowledgment in writing); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-501 (2006) (acknowledgment).
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2) (2005); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-114 (West
2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-438(b) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 508
(2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-4 (LexisNexis
2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-109(b) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-2 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
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established after the father dies.19 In order to establish the parent-
child relationship after the alleged father dies, however, the eviden-
tiary standard is often statutorily raised to a "clear and convincing"
test.2 ° In addition to raising the evidentiary standard, a number of
states also statutorily limit the type of evidence which can be used
to establish a man's fatherhood after his death. Fourteen states
require that the man publicly held himself out as the child's father
prior to his death.2'
ch. 190 § 7 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 700.2114 (Lexisnexis 2006); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.55 (2006); MONT. CODEANN. § 40-6-105 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:4
(West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5 (West 2006);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-18 (West
2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
112.105(2)(West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-45g-201 (2005); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-5(a) (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
852.05 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-107 (West 2005).
19. By statute, Ohio and North Carolina only allow for establishing paternity before
the father's death. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-19 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE § 2105.17
(West 2006). In Ohio, however, some courts do allow for paternity to be established after
the father's death. See, e.g., Brookbank v. Gray, 658 N.E.2d 724, 727 (1996) (recognizing
the Ohio circuit split between means of establishing paternity in intestacy).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-438(b)
(West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-109(b) (2006); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2
(LexisNexis 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105 (West 2006); LA CIV. CODE ANN. art.
209 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(iii)(2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §
30-2309(2) (LexisNexis 2006) ("strict, clear and convincing'); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
561:4 (West 2006); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (LexisNexis 2006); 20 PA.
CONS STAT. ANN. § 2107(c) (West 2006); S.C. CODEANN. § 62-2-109(2) (West 2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-5(a) (LexisNexis 2006); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 891.39 (West 2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-107 (2006).
21. In four states the law requires the party to establish public acknowledgment by
clear and convincing evidence. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b) (West 2006) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence that the father held the child out as his own or a showing
that "it was impossible for the father to hold out the child as his own"); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45a-438(b) (West 2006) (by clear and convincing evidence that father acknowl-
edged in writing and openly treated child as his); D.C. CODE § 19-316 (West 2006); In re
Estate of Glover, 470 A.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (focus after father's death on whether
father held himself out as parent); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (LexisNexis
2005) (by clear and convincing evidence father has "openly and notoriously acknowledged"
the child).
In the remaining ten states that require a father's public acknowledgment in order to
establish paternity after the father's death, the clear and convincing standard is not
statutorily specified. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105 (West 2006) (receives into
home and "openly holds out"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-4 (LexisNexis 2006) (receives
into home and "openly holds out'); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.222 (West 2006) (recognition
of child by father which was "general and notorious" or in writing); MD. CODE ANN. EST.
& TRUSTS §1-208 (West 2006) ("openly and notoriously recognized the child to be his
child"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (West 2006) (receives into home and "openly holds
out"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105 (2004) (receives into home and "represents as his");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051 (West 2006) (receives into home and "openly holds out");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5 (West 2006) (holds out minor child and establishes
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C. Inheritance 'Trom or Through" the Child By Unwed Father or
Father's Kindred
Likewise, if a child who was born out-of-wedlock (or his relations)
die intestate, the state statutory treatment of the relationship be-
tween the father and child is critical. By statute, two states simply
fail to recognize the father or his relations as heirs.22 In the remaining
states, the father and his heirs may be recognized upon the establish-
ment of paternity.23 Generally such means are either identical or con-
sistent with those which must be demonstrated by the child when
the father dies intestate.24 However, in eleven states, demonstrating
the biological connection is insufficient. Such states also require that
the father "has openly treated the child as his and has not refused to
relationship); N.D. CENT. CODE § 301-04-09 (2006) (child received into home and father
"openly holds out"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 2006) ("publicly acknowledged
such child as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married,
into his family and otherwise treating it as if it were a child born in wedlock").
22. The relevant provisions of New Hampshire and Vermont are identical: "The
estate of a person born of unwed parents dying intestate and leaving no issue, nor
husband, nor wife shall descend to the mother, and, if the mother is dead, through the
line of the mother as if the person so dying were born in lawful wedlock." N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 561.4 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 553 (LexisNexis 2006).
23. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-48 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114 (2006); ARK. CODEANN.
§ 28-9-209 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2114 (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6452 (West
2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-114 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-438b (West
2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 508 (2006); D.C. CODE § 19-316 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.108 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-4(b) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-
114 (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-109 (2005); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-2 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.222
(2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-111 (West 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105 (2006); LA
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 203, 209 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 2-109 (2006); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190 § 7 (West 2006);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 700.2114 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-114 (West
2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.060 (West 2006); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 72-2-124 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 126.051 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-10 (West 2006); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-2-114 (West 2006); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.2 (West 2006); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 29-18 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 301-04-09 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84
§ 215 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2105.10 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
112.105 (West 2006); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-
8 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114 (2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2) (2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 9 (Vernon 2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 11.04.081 (2006); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-5 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
852.05 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 2-4-107 (2006).
24. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text (discussing the common means of
establishing paternity).
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support the child."2 This statutory requirement is retained despite
the questions of gender and legitimacy it raises.26
By contrast, fourteen other states have adopted inheritance
standards which apply equally to married and unmarried parents.27
Following the current version of the Uniform Probate Code, six of such
states preclude inheritance from or through a child by either natural
parent or his kindred "unless that natural parent has openly treated
the child as his or hers, and has not refused to support the child."28
The remaining eight states have adopted provisions which similarly
prevent a parent or his kindred from inheriting if the parent has
either abandoned or not supported a minor child.29 Given the limited
use of such gender and marital neutral inheritance provisions, it is
perhaps not surprising that there has been an inconsistent judicial
response to the gender and legitimacy challenges raised against in-
heritance provisions.
The judicial evaluation of contested inheritance provisions ranges
widely. At one extreme, courts have simply denied the provision
creates a gender or a legitimacy disparity."0 At the other extreme,
25. ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2)(b) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 508(2) (2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2-109(b) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105 (West 2006); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 2-109(2)(iii) (West 2006); MISS. CODEANN. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(I) (2006);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.060.2 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2) (2006); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-109(2) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2006); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-5.1.3 (2006).
See also former UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (replaced by UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114
(1990). For further discussion of the changes to the UPC parent-child relationship
provision see infra notes 144, 191 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of such constitutional challenges see infra notes 34-57, 195-204
and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the constitutional challenges raised to such provisions in
Georgia and Utah, respectively, see infra notes 35-40, 51-58 and accompanying text.
28. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (1990). See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(4)
(LexisNexis 2006); MONT. CODEANN. § 72-2-124(3) (2006); N.M. STATANN. § 45-2-114(C)
(West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 301-04-09 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114(a)
(2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114(3) (2006).
29. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-439(a)(1) (2006) (abandonment); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-2 (West 2006) (acknowledgment, establish relationship and support); MD. CODE ANN.
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-112 (West 2006) (abandonment and nonsupport); N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4 (LexisNexis 2006) (abandonment and nonsupport); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.10(B) (West 2006) (abandonment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-114 (2005)
(nonsupport); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (West 2006) (nonsupport); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (2006) (desertion or abandonment). Such state provisions vary in
three key ways: 1) whether there is reliance on abandonment and/or nonsupport; 2) how
such terms are defined; and 3) if such consideration effects only the parents or the
parents and their kindred.
While Tennessee imposes this requirement on both parents, it still requires that the
unwed father demonstrate he "has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused
to support the child." TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (West 2006).
30. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
dissent in Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999) (cert. denied)(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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courts have found a gender or legitimacy disparity and deemed it
unconstitutional.3 Between such extremes, are courts which have
found a gender or legitimacy disparity but determined it to be consti-
tutional.32 Yet despite such inconsistent constitutional results, the
courts commonly evaluate the constitutional claim from the perspec-
tive of the heir rather than the decedent.33 This combination of incon-
sistent constitutional determinations and common orientation toward
the heir leads to the misapplication of equal protection.
II. THE INCONSISTENT USE OF GENDER AND LEGITIMACY
A. Evaluating the Claims of Unwed Fathers
1. As a Matter of Gender
a. Unconstitutional Gender Disparity
In Rainey v. Chever, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a
statute denying an intestate share to an unwed father from his child's
estate if the father had not openly treated the child as his own and
supported the child.34 Without any similar demands for open treat-
ment and support placed upon the mother of a child born out-of-
wedlock, the Georgia Supreme Court easily found the provision
created an unconstitutional gender-based classification which vio-
lated the equal protection clauses of both Georgia and the United
States Constitutions. 5 Relying on the traditional "important govern-
ment interest" and "substantially related" catch phrases of interme-
diate scrutiny, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the state's
interest in encouraging fathers to take responsibility for their chil-
dren born out-of-wedlock.36 However, the state also had an "equally
important interest" in seeing mothers behave accordingly. 7 Mothers
could not be assumed any more so than fathers to care for their
out-of-wedlock children." Georgia's efforts to promote father-child
31. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Georgia court's
decision in Rainey v. Chever, 510 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 1999)).
32. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing Scheller v. Pessetto, 783
P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
33. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
34. 510 S.E.2d 823, 824.
35. Id. at 824.
36. Id. (noting that "[a] statute containing a gender-based classification violates equal
protection unless the classification furthers important governmental objectives, and the
discriminatory means employed are 'substantially related' to the achievement of those
governmental objectives").
37. Id.
38. Id.
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relationships through its inheritance provision relied upon stereo-
types and "overbroad generalizations" about men and women which
the United States Supreme Court had repeatedly warned against
accepting.39 Heeding the recent pronouncement of the United States
Supreme Court, the Georgia Supreme Court also emphasized that
gender-based classifications could no longer be accepted without
demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive justification."4
b. The Supreme Court's Ambivalent Silence
When Rainey was appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
a majority of justices joined in denying certiorari without opinion.41
The Supreme Court's silence could be given two drastically different
interpretations. On the one hand, the decision could be an affirmation
of the Georgia Supreme Court's reasoning. On the other hand, the
silence could be read as federal deference in state matters of pro-
bate. Significantly, since Rainey, gender specific inheritance statutes
have not been judicially struck down in any other states. 42 Such
recognition, combined with the United States. Supreme Court's am-
bivalent treatment of Rainey and the prevalent mistrust of unwed
fathers throughout the law point only toward one possibility.43
Georgia's decision in Rainey is simply an anomaly. The outspoken
opinion offered by the dissenting Supreme Court justices in Rainey
supports such conclusion.
c. Nonexistent Gender Disparity
Disagreeing with the majority's decision to deny certiorari with-
out opinion, the Rainey dissent spoke quite openly.44 It began by
39. Id. (relying on Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1998); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
40. Id. at 825 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). As Rehnquist recognized in his
concurrence in United States v. Virginia, there is an apparent tension between the
traditional intermediate scrutiny language of "important" government interest and the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" demanded by the majority. 518 U.S. at 558-59
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
For a discussion of complications caused by the elevated gender standard in the
inheritance context, see infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
41. Rainey v. Chever, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999).
42. For recognition of the fourteen states that maintain inheritance provisions directed
at unwed fathers see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. Moreover, while Georgia's
highest court may have chosen to reject its gender specific inheritance provision, other
state courts have upheld similar provisions. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text
(discussing Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70 (1989)).
43. For recognition of the disparagement of unwed fathers throughout the law see
infra notes 109-137 and accompanying text.
44. The dissent was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
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remarking that "[t]he rising incidence of out-of-wedlock births and
delinquent fathers has had dire social consequences."45 The dissent
applauded Georgia's legislative effort "to address a particularly dis-
turbing manifestation of this alarming trend" by denying an unwed,
nonsupporting father from "profit[ing] from the death of the child."46
Yet the dissent did not primarily rely on this perception of an unwed
father's behavior to justify the statutory disparity. Instead, it struck
to the very core: the Rainey dissent denied that any gender disparity
existed.4" Georgia's legislation did not draw a distinction between
men and women but rather "between two different categories of men:
fathers who support their children born out-of-wedlock and fathers
who do not."4 Without a gender or legitimacy classification, the Rainey
dissent could easily proceed to apply a rational basis standard and
uphold Georgia's disputed intestate provision.49
d. Constitutional Gender Disparity
While the Georgia Supreme Court in Rainey found a gender clas-
sification entitled to intermediate scrutiny that was unconstitutional,
the dissenters on the U.S. Supreme Court found no suspect class
and determined the statute met the lower rational basis standard.5 °
Scheller v. Pessetto illustrates yet another perspective taken on intes-
tate provisions restricting the inheritance of unwed fathers.51 Scheller
challenged a statutory distinction in Utah identical to the Georgia
and Justice Scalia. Rainey, 527 U.S. 1044 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. "Contrary to the Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion, § 53-2-4(b)(2) does not
necessarily draw a gender-based classification." Id. at 1046.
It should be noted that to complete his opinion, Justice Thomas did conclude that even
if heightened scrutiny did apply, Georgia's statute withstood a challenge based upon
gender. Thomas found support for such gender disparities in the Court's recent plurality
opinion in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) in which the Court accepted a gender
disparity in federal immigration law, as well as the Court's continued recognition of a
"women's unique role in childbirth" in the (unilateral female control over) abortion
context. Rainey v. Chever, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1044, 1047-1048 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). For further discussion of Miller see infra notes 92-100, 132, 158, 184-88 and
accompanying text.
48. Rainey, 527 U.S. 1044, 1046. (Thomas, J., dissenting). A similar distinction drawn
between fathers also resulted in denying the existence of a gender classification in
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). For further discussion of Parham and its treat-
ment of gender see infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
49. Rainey, 527 U.S. 1044, 1047. (Thomas., J. dissenting) (noting that finding any use
of heightened scrutiny "appears to be in error").
50. Id.
51. 783 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). For further discussion of Scheller see infra
notes 60-71 and accompanying text (relying on Scheller to illustrate the varying consti-
tutional means standards and their effect).
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provision attacked in Rainey.2 As in Georgia, the Utah statute al-
lowed a mother of a child born out-of-wedlock to inherit uncondition-
ally and disqualified the unwed father for his failure to support the
child or openly treat the child as his own.53 Like the Georgia Supreme
Court in Rainey, the Utah appellate court in Scheller found the
statute created a gender-based disparity requiring heightened
scrutiny.54 Despite the heightened scrutiny, however, the Utah ap-
pellate court found the statute to be constitutionally sound.55 The
Scheller court found the statute served two important government
interests: supporting "the maintenance of a fair and efficient method
of disposition of property at death" and "encouraging, albeit for
pecuniary purposes, development of an actual familial relationship
between a proven father of an illegitimate child and his child."5
According to Utah, the statute could justifiably be directed only at
fathers because a woman's relationship with her child was easier to
determine and more likely to develop after the child's birth.57
52. Scheller, 783 P.2d at 70.
53. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-109 (2)(b) (1978). Repealed and replaced by Utah Code
Ann. § 75-2-114 (3)(b) (2006) (precluding either the "natural parent or his kindred" from
inheriting from or through a child unless "that natural parent has openly treated the
child as his, and has not refused to support the child").
54. Scheller, 783 P.2d at 72-73. For the Georgia Supreme Court's similar charac-
terization of its state statute in Rainey see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 74. For further discussion of Scheller see Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture:
Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 87 (2003).
56. Scheller, 783 P.2d at 73-74.
57. The identity of the mother of an illegitimate child is rarely in doubt. In
contrast, the father's identity is frequently unknown. It is possible, also,
as in this case, that the father's identity becomes known only because the
mother, or the state, forces the issue by filing a paternity action. In
addition, the mother, because she physically bears the child, automati-
cally is responsible for the child at least to the extent of deciding its
immediate future. Further she bears the physical, emotional and psycho-
logical ramifications of pregnancy and must decide whether to abort the
child, raise the child alone or give the child up for adoption. If she decides
to raise the child, she endures further financial, emotional and psycho-
logical responsibilities. The putative father who does not support the child
or openly treat the child as his own assumes none of these responsibilities.
Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
Recognizing "women's unique role in childbirth," the Rainey dissenters on the United
States Supreme Court made similar observations about the relationships between
children born out-of-wedlock and their mothers and fathers. Rainey v. Chever, cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1044, 1047-48 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 44-
49 and accompanying text (discussing Rainey v. Chever, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1044,
1047-48 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
To further bolster the legitimacy of the challenged inheritance provision, Scheller
noted that the legislation at issue relied on the UPC, which also at the time included
such a provision. Scheller, 783 P.2d at 73-74. Ironically, one year after Scheller the UPC
was revised, replacing the provision disqualifying nonsupporting fathers of children born
out-of-wedlock with the exact gender neutral standard disqualifying nonsupporting
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2. As a Matter of Legitimacy
a. Nonexistent Legitimacy Disparity
The Rainey decisions of the United States and Georgia Supreme
Courts and Utah's ruling in Scheller illustrate the differing inter-
pretations of gender raised in relation to the ability of unwed fathers
to inherit. As the state opinions in Rainey and Scheller reflect, courts
may find a gender disparity but disagree as to whether such disparity
is unconstitutional.58 Alternatively, like the Supreme Court's dissent
in Rainey, a court may opine that no gender disparity worthy of height-
ened scrutiny exists. 9 Such constitutional confusion surrounding
paternal inheritance is further complicated by the use of legitimacy.
Twenty years prior to Rainey, another Georgia statute limiting
the inheritance rights of unwed fathers was challenged in Parham
v. Hughes.6" The statute precluded the father of a child born out-of-
wedlock from collecting from his child's wrongful death unless the
father had taken affirmative action to legitimate the child.6' By
contrast, the statute placed no similar affirmative duties upon the
mother of a child born out-of-wedlock.62 Yet despite this difference in
treatment of unwed mothers and fathers of children, a four justice
plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that the statute
did not create a gender-based classification.63 Distinguishing between
fathers, Parham held that only fathers who failed to legitimate their
children were precluded from filing wrongful death actions." Fathers
who legitimated their children were treated like fathers of children
born in wedlock.65 Consequently, Parham rejected the use of gender,
requiring that "all members of one sex" must be denied a particular
benefit or right despite being otherwise "similarly situated with
members of the other sex."' The Court proceeded to apply the relevant
fathers and mothers that was rejected in Scheller. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-114(c) (1990)
('Inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or his [or her] kindred is
precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or hers], and
has not refused to support the child.").
For similar comments made by the U.S. Supreme Court dissent in Rainey see supra
notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 34-57 and accompanying text (discussing Rainey and Scheller).
59. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
dissent in Rainey).
60. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 355.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 356 (1979).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 357.
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rational basis standard.67 Parham recognized the State's "legitimate
interest in the maintenance of an accurate and efficient system for
the disposition of property at death."' It rationally necessitated that
paternity be established prior to a child's death in order to prevent
"spurious claims."' 9 Unlike the mother of a child born out-of-wedlock
whose identity "will rarely be in doubt,"7 the father was required to
take action to legitimate the child because his identity "will fre-
quently be unknown."'"
3. Reconciling the Use of Gender and Legitimacy in Paternal
Inheritance
Trying to reconcile the recent use of gender in Rainey and
Scheller with the older use of the legitimacy in Parham is a difficult
task. While Rainey and Scheller consider the support expectation
of an out-of-wedlock father and Parham considers his legitimation
expectation, the difference in the type of statutory expectation does
not explain the difference in the type of constitutional classification
chosen. Requiring "all members of one sex" to suffer discrimination,
the Parham plurality determined that because "only a father can by
unilateral action legitimate a illegitimate child," fathers were not
similarly situated to mothers and therefore there was no discrimina-
tion against fathers as a class. However, the Court's reasoning was
circular: it was the State that imposed the legitimization requirement
that prevented fathers from being similarly situated to mothers.73
Unlike the plurality, the Parham concurrence and dissent recognized
a gender classification but disagreed regarding its constitutionality.74
In his concurrence, Justice Powell upheld the gender disparity upon
determining that the legitimation requirement was "substantially re-
lated to achievement of the important state objective of avoiding diffi-
cult problems in proving paternity after the death of an illegitimate
67. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347,357 (1979) (plurality opinion). Without a gender
classification, no intermediate level of review was required; as heightened scrutiny
would not be formally recognized for legitimacy classifications for another nine years.
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (relying on an intermediate level of scrutiny to
strike down a six year statute of limitation period in which a illegitimate child was
required to prove paternity prior to receiving support from his father).
68. Parham, 441 U.S. at 357.
69. Id. (quoting Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978)).
70. Id. at 355.
71. Id.
72. Id. at. 356-57.
73. Id. at 361-62 (White, J., dissenting).
74. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359, 362 (1979).
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child.""5 The dissent clearly disagreed: 'The plain facts of the matter
are that the statute conferring the right to recovery for the wrongful
death of a child discriminates between unmarried mothers and
unmarried fathers, and that this discrimination is but one degree
greater than the statutory discrimination between married mothers
and married fathers. 76
The five justices' use of gender in Parham discredits the plural-
ity's effort to deny a gender classification.7 Of course, one could as
easily critique the plurality's and.concurrence's agreement regard-
ing the existence of a gender classification but disagreement re-
garding its constitutionality. Likewise, the exclusive use of gender
in Rainey and Scheller is unsatisfying. Each state's statute pre-
cluded only non-supporting fathers of children born out-of-wedlock.78
The inheritance of fathers of children born in wedlock was not con-
ditioned in any manner upon support. Parham suggests that the
statutory preclusion of inheritance to non-supporting fathers re-
viewed in both cases could have been constitutionally assessed as a
legitimacy-illegitimacy classification.79 Yet there was no discussion of
the legitimacy-illegitimacy distinction on behalf of fathers in either
Rainey opinion issued by the Georgia Supreme Court' or United
States Supreme Court.8 Such discussion was also absent in Scheller."2
75. Id. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id. at. 362 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Justice White's dissent in Parham was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun. Id. at 361-62 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's concurrence was not
joined by any other justices. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. Georgia's former statute stated:
[N]either the father nor any child of the father nor any other paternal kin
shall inherit from or through a child born out-of-wedlock if it shall be es-
tablished by a preponderance of evidence that the father failed or refused
openly to treat the child as his own or failed or refused to provide support
for the child.
GA. CODEANN. §53-2-4(b)(2) (West 2006). For discussion of Rainey's role in bringing such
statutory changes in Georgia see supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
Similarly, Utah's former statute stated:
[P] aternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father
or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, except that the
paternity established.., is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred
to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly treated the
child as his and has not refused to support the child.
UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-109 (West 2006) (repealed 2002). For discussion of Scheller's role
in bringing such statutory changes in Utah see supra notes 51-57 and accompanying
text.
79. Parham, 441 U.S. at 356 (plurality opinion).
80. Rainey v. Chever, 510 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 1999).
81. Rainey v. Chever, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999).
82. Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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B. Evaluating the Claims of Nonmarital Children
1. The Limited Use of Legitimacy
The cases are also inconsistent in the evaluation of intestate
provisions directed at nonmarital children. Unlike the mixed use of
gender and legitimacy in reviewing provisions focused on the ability
of a surviving father or kindred to inherit "from or through" a de-
ceased child born out-of-wedlock, legitimacy has been the single stan-
dard relied upon in evaluating the ability of a surviving, nonmarital
child to inherit "from or through" his deceased father."3 However, the
sole use of legitimacy to evaluate such children's inheritance claims
also poses problems.
On three separate occasions, the Supreme Court tested State
efforts to limit the ability of nonmarital children to inherit from their
fathers. These cases reviewed two types of measures - those requir-
ing parents of a nonmarital child to marry in order to legitimate the
child' and those allowing an unwed father's paternity to be estab-
lished by additional means but requiring such actions be completed
during the father's lifetime. 5 In Reed v. Campbell6 and Trimble v.
Gordon,7 the Court struck down the marriage requirement because
of its absolute nature. By contrast, the more flexible evidentiary pro-
visions were upheld in Lalli v. Lalli.m
In each case, the State's interest in ensuring the "orderly and just
distribution of a decedent's property at death" was recognized as the
strongest argument in favor of upholding limits on children's claims.
Reliance on legitimacy requirements "in order to express state dis-
approval of parents' misconduct" 9 was soundly rejected, interpreted
as the "illogical and unjust" punishment of children.9 °
83. For a discussion of the mixed use of gender and legitimacy in evaluating the
inheritance claims of unwed fathers see supra notes 35-82 and accompanying text.
84. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 857, (1986) (striking down a Texas statute
requiring parents of an illegitimate child to marry in order for the child to inherit from
the father); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down an Illinois statute
requiring parents of an illegitimate child to marry in order for the child to inherit from
the father). Reed effectively applied the reasoning of Trimble retroactively in order to
strike down the Texas statute. The Texas courts in Reed had refused to apply Trimble
because the decedent-father in Reed had died four months prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Trimble and the child in Trimble did not file her claim until after Trimble
was decided. Reed, 476 U.S. 852, 856 (1986).
85. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978).
86. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 856-57 (1986).
87. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 773 (1977).
88. LaWi, 439 U.S. 259 at 274-75.
89. Reed, 476 U.S. at 854.
90. [Visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society's dis-
approval of the parents' liaison "is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
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2. The Resistance to Gender
While the Supreme Court consistently uses legitimacy to eval-
uate intestate provisions restricting the ability of children to inherit
from their unwed fathers, one might query why the gender implica-
tions have not been considered. Greater restrictions are placed on
the ability of children to inherit from their unwed fathers than on the
ability of children to inherit from their unwed mothers. 1
Outside the inheritance context, the Supreme Court has resisted
considering a claim of gender raised by a child indirectly affected by
state action.92 In the highly splintered Miller v. Albright, deliberations
centered around the child's gender claim.9" At issue was a federal im-
migration statute denyingjus sanguinis citizenship to a nonmarital
child born abroad to a United States citizen father and an alien mother
unless paternity had been established during the child's minority.94
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual - as well as
an unjust - way of deterring the parent."
Reed, 476 U.S. at 852, 854, n. 5 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972)).
91. See discussion of statutes Supra notes 11-26.
92. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434-35 (1998) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. The majority position in Miller was comprised of three separate opinions, with
the Court opinion written by Justice Stevens and joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Two concurring opinions were written by Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Kennedy)
and Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas). Two dissenting opinions were also issued
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who joined each other's opinions and were each joined
by Justice Souter. While the opinions varied in their approach to the gender issue, they
uniformly chose not to consider any difference drawn between legitimate and illegitimate
children. Id. at 428-29 (plurality opinion) (holding that certiorari was only granted to
address the different statutory treatment based upon gender); Id. at 451 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (refusing to review any possible legitimacy distinction because it had not
been presented); Id. 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusing to review any claimed gender
or legitimacy distinction due to the broad congressional authority over citizenship) Id. at
457 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reviewing only the gender disparity); Id. at 469 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (reviewing only the gender disparity).
For an analysis of the opinions and their significance in immigration law see Cornelia
T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and
Executive Branch Decisions Making in Miller v. Albright, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 1. See also
Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards'Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding Citizens
and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 557, 557-
60, 565-72 (2000).
94. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2006).
Because the plaintiff/child in Miller was born prior to the 1986 amendments to this pro-
vision, paternity could be established by legitimation or a court adjudication of paternity
prior to the child turning twenty-one. The 1986 amendments further restricted the
ability to confer citizenship on a child born abroad and out-of-wedlock to a United States
male citizen and an alien female by requiring that the father-child relationship be
established prior to the child reaching eighteen and by requiring that the father evidence
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By contrast, no such constraints were placed upon a nonmarital child's
ability to acquire citizenship if born abroad to a United States citizen
mother and an alien father.9 .
In an opinion written for the Court, Justice Stevens joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized a gender distinction "between citi-
zen fathers and citizen mothers of children born out-of-wedlock." In
two dissenting opinions, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter also
recognized a gender distinction worthy of review. 7
The concurring judges fundamentally disagreed with the plu-
rality's and dissent's determination that a gender disparity existed
which should be reviewed."8 While concurring in the decision to up-
hold the statute, Justices O'Connor joined by Justice Kennedy refused
to recognize a gender disparity because the father was not before
the Court.99 In another concurrence, Justice Scalia joined by Justice
Thomas also refused to review any claimed gender distinction, hold-
ing that Congress's plenary power over immigration trumped any
individual equal protection concerns. 100
financial support of the child. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657
(codified as amended at INA § 309(a)(3)-(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3)-(4) (2005)).
95. INA § 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2006).
96. Miller, 523 U.S. at 429 (plurality opinion). In determining that the gender
distinction withstood constitutional challenge, Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied on a somewhat muted level of intermediate scrutiny, perhaps reflecting
that gender distinctions drawn in the immigration arena are subject to a lesser level of
review because of the plenary power awarded the political branches in matters of immi-
gration. While Justice Stevens's opinion never clearly articulates his standard of review,
the opinion suggests the statute served the "important purposes" of establishing pater-
nity, encouraging parent and child relationships, and developing ties between a foreign-
born child and the United States. Id. at 438. The opinion speaks in terms of "strong govern-
ment interests," with a statutory means that is "well tailored to serve those interests."
Id. at 440.
97. Having agreed with the plurality on the finding of a gender disparity but
ultimately dissenting, the dissenting opinions both concluded that the gender disparity
violated equal protection. Id. at 457 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J. and
Souter, J.); id. at 469 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.).
98. Id. at 448 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Although the Miller suit was originally brought by the foreign-born daughter and
her United States citizen father, only the foreign-born daughter remained as a plaintiff
when Miller reached the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the father
was originally a party to the suit and that he had been "erroneously dismissed" by the
Eastern District of Texas. However, Justice O'Connor concluded that such dismissal did
not give the daughter proper third party standing but merely presented a matter for the
father to appeal. Id. at 448 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Disregarding the gender challenge altogether, Justices Scalia and Thomas simply
determined the Court had "no power" to question congressional authority over matters
of citizenship. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452-53 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia's opinion is an extension of Congress's plenary power over matters of im-
migration addressing questions of citizenship. For further discussion of the plenary power
doctrine see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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The confusion caused by this multitude of opinions was some-
what ameliorated three years later. In Nguyen v. INS, an unwed
United States citizen father joined his child born abroad to renew
Miller's contest against the federal immigration statute denying jus
sanguinis citizenship.' The Supreme Court in Nguyen unanimously
recognized the father's right to raise gender.' °2
In other contexts, resolving the existing limits on gender by antic-
ipating that nonmarital fathers and children will simply join together
is not always realistic. When an intestate distribution is at stake,
unwed fathers and their children may have conflicting interests that
prevent such a solution. 103 Resistance to the use of gender by chil-
dren indirectly affected in the inheritance context poses significant
problems as it prevents a balanced evaluation of intestate rights.
3. The Double-Edged Dilemma of Gender and the Inheritance
Rights of Unwed Children
Challenges to inheritance provisions raised by unwed fathers
have been evaluated, albeit inconsistently, based upon gender and
legitimacy."° By contrast, the claims raised by children against intes-
tate schemes have only gone forward upon legitimacy.' 5 While gender
and legitimacy are both identified as necessitating an intermediate
level of review, the standards of gender and legitimacy have recently
diverged. In U.S. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court announced that gen-
der classifications could only be upheld upon a showing of an "exceed-
ingly persuasive government interest."' 6 Untouched by Virginia,
legitimacy remains at the standard of an "important state interest."'' 7
Given the different measures for evaluating the ends, state inheri-
tance provisions directed at fathers and those directed at their chil-
dren, despite raising similar interests, are not subject to similar
101. 533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001).
102. 'The father is before the Court in this case; and as all agree he has standing to
raise the constitutional claim, we now resolve it." Id. at 58. However, while agreeing on
the father's right to raise the issue of gender, the Court disagreed in its evaluation of the
claimed gender disparity. For discussion of the Nguyen Court's divided treatment of the
father's gender claim see infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
103. For recognition of the conflicting interests of unwed fathers and children in the
inheritance context, as illustrated by the facts of Rainey, see infra notes 195-200 and
accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 34-81 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistent use of
gender and legitimacy in the review of an unwed father's intestate distribution).
105. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing the review of an unwed
child's intestate distribution).
106. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
107. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 356 (1979).
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review because gender is not uniformly recognized.10 This difference
yields further inconsistencies in inheritance.
III. THE MISAPPLICATION OF GENDER & LEGITIMACY
What explains such difficulties? The inconsistency and limits of
gender and legitimacy apparent in inheritance is deeply rooted in a
conflict between politics and theory that extends well beyond this
area. Legal consideration of inheritance privileges are part of an
agenda to protect innocent children from wayward fathers. Such
effort competes with a more abstract desire to preserve constitu-
tional methodology.
A. The Bias of Bastardy
Mistrust of unwed fathers exists throughout the law. Ironically,
the disparagement of unwed fathers evident in such discrete areas
as inheritance, custody, adoption, and immigration, grew from a
desire to protect men. The notion of coverture, dedicated to giving
a man effective ownership over his wife and legitimate children, ex-
tended to deny the relation between a father and his illegitimate
children.' Through the concept of filius nullius, the illegitimate
child was the child and heir of no one."0 This rule ensured that a man
remained in complete control of his property and family lineage.'
108. For a discussion of the common state interests in inheritance restrictions placed
upon unwed fathers and children see infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. The
common interests between such provisions and the need therefore to use a common stan-
dard of review has received some judicial recognition. In evaluating an intestate pro-
vision limiting the rights of unwed fathers based on legitimacy, a North Carolina appellate
court recognized the provision was motivated by the same state interests recognized in
the North Carolina Supreme Court's legitimacy-based evaluation of a intestate provision
limiting the inheritance privileges of children born out-of-wedlock. See Stern v. Stern,
311 S.E.2d 909, 911-12 (N.C. App. 1984) (relying on Mitchell v. Freuler, 254 S.E.2d 762
(N.C. 1979)).
109. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband." LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 32 (3rd
ed., 2005) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
442 (W. Lewis ed., 1897); see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 207-18 (1985). For further discussion
of coverture see Kelly, Republican Mothers, supra note 92, at 561.
110. GROSSBERG, supra note 109, at 197.
111. Id. at 196. For recognition of how such legal treatment of illegitimacy adheres to
liberalism's use of a facially neutral law to mask male dominance see Kelly, Republican
Mothers, supra note 84, at 562, n. 23. For extensive discussions of liberalism's principle
of neutrality see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991); Robin L. West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term: Foreword: Taking
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When the turn of the nineteenth century and the coming of the in-
dustrial revolution brought a shift to male employment outside the
home, changes in the domestic roles of men and women also occurred.
Shedding the existing female image of "devious, sexually vo-
racious, emotionally inconstant, or physically and intellectually infe-
rior," women became the models of virtue and care.112 Once assigned
the domestic child care role left vacant by their working husbands,
it followed that women could be recognized as the "natural guardians"
of children born out-of-wedlock. 13 Recognition of the nurturing bond
between the unwed mother and child would also alleviate the stigma
of bastardy for their children." 4
In contrast to the nurturing role assigned unwed mothers and
the destigmatization of nonmarital children, unwed fathers were cast
as the "debtors and criminals."1 5 Given the ability to earn wages out-
side the home, men were expected to support their children conceived
outside the home." ' Consistently, changes made to recognize the rela-
tionship between the unwed father and his child in inheritance were
not motivated by a desire to recognize unwed fathers but rather by
a desire to eliminate "outdated discrimination in inheritance laws
against 'half-bloods,' illegitimates, aliens, and females.""1
7
1. Custody
Today, the financial "legacy of coverture" is the mainstay of the
relationship between a father and his out-of-wedlock children."'
Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REv. 43,45-46 (1990); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-82 (1986).
112. MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 51 (1993); see also Kelly, Republican
Mothers, supra note 84, at 561-65 (describing the shift in gender roles).
113. Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 110 (1 Tyng) (1806) (Parsons, C.J., concurring);
see also GROSSBERG, supra note 109, at 208.
114. As one commentator describes, the destigmatization of illegitimate children
occurred when the "aristocratic, property-conscious English view by which a heartless
monetary interest in maintaining established lines of descent [was] overruled [by] com-
passion and common sense." GROSSBERG, supra note 109, at 204; see also Kelly, Republican
Mothers, supra note 92, at 563.
115. GROSSBERG, supra note 109, at 215.
116. Id. at 207-18.
117. Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70, 73-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Wellman
& Gordan, Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPCArticle IIhas Fared in Nine
Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 357, 360).
118. Janet Calvo developed the term "legacies of coverture" to recognize how existing
.immigration law allowed an abusive husband to control his wife's ability to secure lawful
residency in the United States. Janet Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The
Legacies of Coverture, 28 SANDIEGOL. REV. 593,595 (1991). The term also aptly describes
the limited role accredited to unwed fathers. For further discussion of the disparagement
EQUAL PROTECTION MISAPPLIED
Given his minimal financial expectation, an unwed father must prove
his capacity to care prior to being able to enjoy or exercise a paternal
role. The "prove it or lose it" approach to fatherhood is evident in the
willingness to uphold state provisions restricting an unwed father's
custodial rights.119 In Stanley v. Illinois, a statutory prohibition
against an unwed father's absolute right to custody of his children
upon their mother's death was only determined to amount to an equal
protection violation after the father was deemed to have a pre-
existing relationship with his children.12 ° The presumption that an
unwed father cannot have a valuable relationship with his child is
so strong that the Supreme Court has also been willing to deny
standing to an unwed father (with a 98% scientific certainty of being
the father) in his effort to establish himself as the father of a child
born to a married woman.12'
2. Adoption
The presumed noninvolvement of unwed fathers in the lives of
their children is in sharp contrast to the presumed care of unwed
mothers. While nonmarital mothers are afforded the same recog-
nition as married parents, nonmarital fathers remain suspect. Such
difference is clearly evident in adoption. A nonmarital father's right
to notice, hearing, and consent prior to adoption have all been chal-
lenged.'22 In each instance, the nonmarital father must prove his
paternal role before he is legally accorded the same recognition un-
questionably given to married parents and nonmarital mothers. 23
In Caban v. Mohammed, while the Court struck down a statute
requiring consent of the mother but not the consent of the father of
a child born out-of-wedlock prior to his adoption, it did so only to the
of unwed fathers see Linda Kelly, The Alienation of Fathers, 6 MICH. J. OF RACE & LAW 181
(2000); Kelly, Republican Mothers, supra note 92; Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood,
48 FiA. L. REv. 523 (1996); Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
375, 378 (1996).
119. Nancy Dowd has noted that "something more" than a blood connection needs to
be demonstrated by unwed fathers to secure parenting privileges. See Dowd, supra note
118, at 526.
120. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); see also Kelly, Alienation of Fathers,
supra note 118, at 187-88.
121. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989). Michael H. also confirms the
societal and legal preference for a child to be raised in a two-parent, nuclear family. The
Court observed in denying the unwed biological father all rights and duties while simul-
taneously assuming all such obligations would be taken on by the mother's husband that
nuclear families have our "historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong
a term." Id. at 123; see also Kelly, Alienation of Fathers, supra note 118, at 188.
122. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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extent the father was known or ascertainable and the child was be-
yond infancy.'24 Such ruling affirmed the Court's unanimous decision
in Quilloin v. Walcott, which allowed a child to be adopted by the
husband of the natural mother over the objection of the natural father
who had never sought custody or taken any responsibility for the
child.125 Notwithstanding the constitutional niceties of due process
and equal protection, the minimal expectations of notice and hear-
ing cannot be taken for granted by nonmarital fathers. In Lehr v.
Robertson, while nonmarital fathers who filed a statement of pater-
nity in the "putative father's registry" would be entitled to notice
and hearing prior to his child's adoption, the state was not required
to develop a more extensive system to ascertain and notify fathers
who had never claimed responsibility for their children born out-of-
wedlock. 2 '
3. Immigration
Similar mistreatment of nonmarital fathers in the immigration
context should not be overlooked or explained simply as a product
of the "plenary power" awarded Congress and the President over
matters relating to immigration.'27 Unlike jus soli citizenship
124. 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979), on remand, 47 N.Y.2d 880, 881 (1979). The New York
statute treated the mother of an illegitimate child as it treated the parents of legitimate
children by providing her with an absolute veto power over the adoption unless the parent
had abandoned the child or had been otherwise judicially deemed unfit. Id. at 385-86. By
contrast, ifa father of an illegitimate child protested his child's adoption, a hearing would
ensue to determine the adoptive parent's fitness. See id. at 387.
125. 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978).
126. 463 U.S. 248,264 (1983); see also Kelly, Alienation of Fathers, supra note 118, at 188.
127. The plenary, or absolute, power of the political branches over immigration is
widely recognized, interpreted, and critiqued. For the lead cases acknowledging the
broad federal authority over immigration see for example, Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) (recognizing the Congressional authority to
control the due process rights of returning legal residents); United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (deeming federal power to exclude aliens free
from judicial review); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (deter-
mining absolute political power to deport aliens); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 585 (1889) (determining absolute political power to exclude aliens).
For a sampling from the vast breadth of literature on the plenary power of immi-
gration, see generally Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1087 (1995) (cautioning that plenary power doctrine's application has gone beyond
immigration matters); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545
(1990) (suggesting some decline in the use of plenary power doctrine); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984
SUP. CT. REV. 255 (discussing the foundation of the plenary power doctrine); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
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conferred with birth upon U.S. land and constitutionally protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,'28 jus sanguinis citizenship con-
ferred by blood is a statutory prerogative.' 29 Such opportunity has
allowed Congress to exercise the bias of bastardy against non-
marital fathers.
Current statutory provisions ofjus sanguinis require that when
a child is born abroad to a unmarried United States citizen man and
an alien woman, the child must demonstrate that the father has
legally recognized and agreed to financially support such child
during his minority.130 By contrast, no similar requirements are
imposed when a child is born abroad to an unmarried United States
and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (recognizing the ongoing influence of the
plenary power doctrine).
128. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868). While this constitutional provision has served as
the basis for citizenship for all non-aborigines physically born in the United States, the
phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof' has been used to question such uncategorical
recognition. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
CONSENT - ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985), cf., Gerald L. Neuman,
Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987). The "subject to the jurisdiction
thereof' conditional has also required statutory recognition of the citizenship rights of
individuals born in United States territories and (perhaps ironically) to aborigines. INA
§301(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(b) (West 2006) (recognizing citizenship of individuals "born
in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian or other aboriginal
tribe."); INA § 302, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1402 (West 2006) (recognizing citizenship of individuals
born in Puerto Rico); INA § 306, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (West 2006) (recognizing citizenship
of individuals born in the Virgin Islands); INA § 307, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 2006)
(recognizing citizenship of individuals born in Guam).
129. While the statutes governing citizenship by descent have changed considerably
over the years, the concept is currently governed largely by INA § 301, 8 U.S.C.A § 1401
(West 2006). The date of an individual's birth may subject him to older statutory pro-
visions. For an excellent overview and guide to applying the changing requirements see
Robert A. Mautino, Acquisition of Citizenship, IMMIGRA. BRIEFINGS (April, 1990), see also
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1269-73 (4th ed.
2005). For an extensive historical account of the changes in United States jus sanguinis
policy, see CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); see also Kelly, Republican Mothers, supra note 92,
at 565-71.
130. INA § 309(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(3) (West 2006) (requiring that the father
"has agreed in writing to provide financial support for [the child] until [the child] reaches
the age of 18 years"); INA § 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. §1409(a)(4) (West 2006) (requiring that
the father legally recognize the child by either legitimating the child pursuant to the law
of the child's country, acknowledging paternity of the child by written oath, or allowing
a court to adjudicate paternity). Of course the blood relationship of the parent and child
and the father's United States citizenship at the time of the child's birth must also be
established. INA § 309(a)(4)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(4)(1)-(2) (West 2006). For a com-
parison of the historical developments ofjus sanguinis and the distinctions drawn between
the children of unmarried United States citizen men and alien women and those of
unmarried United States women and alien men see Kelly, Republican Mothers, supra
note 92, at 568-71.
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citizen woman and an alien man.13' Through a pair of cases, the
Supreme Court recently affirmed and re-affirmed this discrimina-
tory practice. Sharing the stereotypical suspicion of nonmarital
fathers, a majority of the Supreme Court in Miller v. Albright132 and
again in Nguyen v. I.N.S.'33 accepted the disparity as necessary in
order to encourage caregiving by men.
Other provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act simi-
larly discriminate against nonmarital fathers. While married women,
nonmarried women, and married men holding United States citizen-
ship or lawful permanent residency may petition for the lawful per-
manent residency of their children born abroad simply by evidencing
the biological connection, nonmarried fathers must demonstrate "a
bona fide parent-child relationship."'" That particular disparity has
not been reviewed by the Supreme Court; however, in Fiallo v. Bell,
the Court willingly accepted a more restrictive provision that alto-
gether denied both citizen and lawful permanent resident fathers
the right to petition for the residency of their children born abroad
and out-of-wedlock.' 35 Despite the provision's political amelioration
131. In addition to proof of blood relationship and the mother's United States
citizenship at the time of the child's birth, the currentjus sanguinis statute also requires
that United States citizen mothers of nonmarital children born abroad after December
23, 1952, evidence one year of physical presence in the United States. INA § 309(c), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1409(c) (West 2006).
132. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 440 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding that
"Congress obviously has a powerful interest in fostering ties" between the father and
minor child). The Court's opinion in Miller was rendered by only two judges who found
no constitutional violation to gender or legitimacy. Id. at 423. The Miller majority rendered
two other opinions; however, neither squarely addressed the constitutional question. See
Miller, 523 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that congressional authority over
immigration controlled even assuming an equal protection violation); Miller, 523 U.S. at
445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the petitioner/child in Miller lacked stand-
ing to raise her father's gender claim). For Miller's influence on the ability of a child to
raise a gender claim against any state action directed at her father, see infra notes 184-91
and accompanying text.
133. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) ("Congress is well within its authority
in refusing, absent proof of at least the opportunity for the development of a relationship
between citizen parent and child, to commit this country to embracing a child as a
citizen."). The Supreme Court's decision to review in Nguyen the gender challenge raised
against the exact statutory provision reviewed only three years earlier resulted from the
confusion fostered by Miller's failure to deliver a majority ruling regarding the gender-
based classification. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 58-59. For a discussion of Miller see supra note
132 and accompanying text. For Miller's precedential value in establishing the ability
of a child to raise a gender claim against any state action directed at her parent, see
infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
134. INA § 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (West 2006).
135. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 800 (1977). Although securing lawful permanent
residency as a result of a father's citizenship is certainly less advantageous than having
citizenship immediately conferred through the citizenship of one's father, both processes
are necessary because a child is not eligible for derivative citizenship unless his parent
was a citizen at the time of the child's birth and has met all the necessary physical
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several years later, its remaining discriminatory undercurrent evi-
dences the legacy of deeply held social distrust of nonmarital
fathers.136 Such ongoing disparagement undercuts Fiallo's confidence
in the political branch's ability to correct discrimination.137
B. The Principled Constitutional Debate
Difficulties raised by the prejudices held against nonmarital
fathers are compounded by differences regarding the constitutional
rigor required to evaluate a claimed constitutional disparity of gender
or legitimacy. Such differences exist both inside and outside the in-
heritance context. While it is critical to acknowledge such differences,
it cannot be done in the abstract. Methodological differences may be
the product of deeply felt constitutional principles; they may also,
however, simply be the means of reaching clearly identified ends.
1. In the Inheritance Context
The nature of the means-ends fit has been disputed several times
in the context of inheritance. In Lalli v. Lalli, the Supreme Court eval-
uated a New York statute denying the ability of an illegitimate child
to inherit from his father's estate unless paternity was legally es-
tablished during the father's lifetime. 3 ' Upholding the statute, the
three judge plurality refused to consider whether a more "equitably"'139
written provision could better serve the state's recognized interest
in protecting fathers and rightful heirs from "fraudulent claims of
heirship and harassing litigation."'4 ° The Court noted that "[t]hese
residency criteria. Likewise, the children of lawful permanent residents must also rely
on the residency process because of their parents' foreign citizenship. For a general
discussion of the INA's family petitioning process, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 129, at 280-
92. For further discussion of Fiallo and the post-Fiallo legislative developments regarding
nonmarital fathers and their ability to petition for the residency of their children see
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
291-303 (5th ed., 2003); Kelly, Republican Mothers, supra note 92, at 572-74.
136. See Immigration Reform and Control Act § 315(a) (1986).
137. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 798-99; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 135, at 301 (skepti-
cally evaluating the political developments post-Fiallo).
138. The statute further required that paternity must be established either while the
mother was pregnant or within two years of the child's birth. 439 U.S. 259, 261 n.2 (1978).
The court did not focus on the two-year condition because appellant had not attempted to
establish paternity at all. Id. at 262. He challenged the statute outright, rather than
limiting his attack to the condition that paternity had to be established during the
relevant two-year period, because attacking the provision did not improve his argument.
139. Id. at 274.
140. Id. at 271 (quoting the Fourth Report of the Temporary State Commission on the
Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No.
19 at 265 (1965)). Justice Powell wrote the court opinion and was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Stewart. Id. at 259.
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matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for [the
State].... In the end, the precise accuracy of [the State's] calcula-
tions is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have
no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and
substantiality." '' The four judge dissent refused to defer so easily
to the legislature:1 4 1 "[L]ess drastic means" of determining fraudu-
lent claims of paternity existed. 143 The state could recognize a father's
formal acknowledgment of paternity.144 Alternatively, the illegitimate
child could prove paternity after the father's death "by an elevated
standard of proof."'
145
Since Lalli, many state inheritance statutes rely on exactly these
types of "less drastic means" to establish paternity,14 the judicial
equivocation between the standards of "less drastic means,' ' 47 and
"within constitutional limitations"' prevents the forging of any pre-
dictable standard of review in cases of gender or legitimacy. The
effect of this equivocation is evident in the review provided by two
different states' courts to identical inheritance provisions.
a. The 'Within Constitutional Limits" Standards
Relying upon the "within constitutional limits" test, the Utah
Supreme Court in Scheller v. Pessetto upheld a Utah provision deny-
ing an unwed father and his kindred the ability to inherit "from or
through" his child unless the father had established paternity, had
"openly treated the child as his, and ha[d] not refused to support the
child."14 Despite recognizing that the gender disparity could easily
be eliminated by also holding mothers to a support and care standard,
the Utah Supreme Court determined that consideration was beyond
the scope of its judicial role: 50 "[t]he relevant inquiry, however, is
not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been
141. Id. at 274 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515-16 (1976)).
142. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices White,
Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 259, 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 278-79.
144. Id. at 279.
145. Id. (suggesting such evidentiary standards as "clear and convincing evidence" or
"beyond a reasonable doubt").
146. Id. at 278-79. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing state
standards for a surviving child to establishing a parent-child relationship).
147. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 278-79 (1978) (Brennan J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70, 74 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Lalli,
439 U.S. at 274.
149. Scheller, 783 P.2d 70, 71-72 (quoting UTAH CODEANN. § 75-2-109(i)(b)(ii) (1976)).
For further discussion of Scheller, see supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 74.
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but whether the line chosen by the [legislature] is within constitu-
tional limitations."'151
Ironically, the Utah legislature subsequently amended its in-
heritance scheme in accordance with the gender-neutral proposal
dismissed by Scheller.'52 In Utah, mothers and fathers are now both
held to a support and care standard in order to inherit by and through
children born out-of-wedlock.' 53
b. The "Least Restrictive Means" Standard
Using the "least restrictive means analysis" allows gender-based
statutes to be more critically evaluated by the courts. In Hicks v.
Hicks, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down an Illinois provision
denying an intestate share to unwed, nonsupporting fathers identical
to the Utah provision upheld in Scheller.' Even assuming the State's
"compelling interest" in recognizing the presumed desire of the de-
cedent to provide only for her mother because she was unlikely to
have a relationship with her father, the Illinois Supreme Court recog-
nized a less restrictive alternative.'55 Rather than denying intestate
shares to all out-of-wedlock fathers, intestate succession could be
allowed "by any parent who has acknowledged and supported their
[sic] illegitimate child." '' S
Such differences between Scheller and Hicks stem from different
judicial standards. Although ultimately the same gender-neutral
change was made in Utah and Illinois, Utah's change was politically
forced, while Illinois's was judicially willed. It would be foolish, how-
ever, to complacently believe similar results will always be achieved.
Judicial and legislative thinking does not always reflect common
interests. Statutory gender disparities may be left unresolved by state
legislatures. Significantly, only fourteen states currently adhere to
151. Id. (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 473
(1981)).
152. Id.
153. UTAH CODEANN. § 75-2-114 (2006). For a fuller discussion of Utah's use of a gender-
neutral support and care inheritance statute and adoption of similar by fourteen other
states, see supra notes 27-29 and infra note 203 and accompanying text.
154. In re Estate of Hicks, 675 N.E.2d 89, 93 (Ill. 1996) (citing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-2(D) (West 1994)). For a discussion of ScheUer see supra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text.
155. Id. at 94-95.
156. Id. at 94 (recognizing the current UPC to require that "[i]nheritance from or
through a child by either natural parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless the
natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not refused to support
the child") (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. § 2-114(c) (1990) (additions in original).
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gender-neutral support requirements as a precondition to inheritance
by surviving parents.'57
2. Outside the Inheritance Context
In matters unrelated to inheritance, the Supreme Court has also
applied differing standards to review state action impacting unwed
fathers and their children. When the Supreme Court revisited the
contested citizenship statute upheld in Miller,5 ' the Nguyen majority
and the dissent formally spoke in terms of reviewing the statute
based on a heightened scrutiny standard requiring the "discrimina-
tory means [to be] substantially related [ to an] important" govern-
ment interest.159 The actual evaluation of the majority and dissent
however evidences a deep divide.
The Nguyen majority accepted the government interests in
"assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists"'6 ° and in
providing an "opportunity" for an actual relationship based upon
"real, everyday ties" to develop.' 6 ' By contrast, the dissent rejected
the government's defense as post hoc rationale that had not been
contemplated by Congress.'62 The most critical difference between
the majority and the dissent, however, turned on evaluating the re-
lation between the statutory means used to achieve state interests.'
63
While the majority asserted in theory its reliance upon a standard
157. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the states' use of gender
neutral inheritance provisions).
158. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998). For further discussions of Miller see
supra note 120 and infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
159. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53,60 (2001) (majority opinion) (quoting United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)); id. at 77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). The Nguyen majority opinion was issued by Justice
Kennedy and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 56
(majority opinion). Although Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion, he also wrote a
brief three sentence concurrence in order to emphasized that he "remain[ed] of the view
that the Court" could not regulate Congress's exclusive immigration power, he thought
it "appropriate" to review the equal protection claim as the majority of the Court in Miller
and Nguyen had "concluded otherwise." Id. at 73. Justice Thomas also joined both the
majority and concurring opinions. Id.
160. Id. at 62.
161. Id. at 64-65.
162. Id. at 75. "mhe majority hypothesizes about the interests served by the statute
and fails adequately to inquire into the actual purposes of § 1409(a)(4)." Id. at 78
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. As recognized by the dissent, "[tihe most important difference between height-
ened scrutiny and rational basis review, of course, is the required fit between the means
employed and the ends served." Id. at 77.
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of heightened scrutiny, it relied in fact on a much lesser standard. 164
In order to be recognized as a father, the statute mandated "clear
and convincing evidence" of a blood relationship'65 and that pater-
nity legally be established during the child's minority.'66 The father
challenged such an exacting standard, arguing that today's ex-
tremely reliable DNA testing was sufficient to meet the state interest
in establishing paternity. 67 Defending Congress, the majority stated,
"[t]he Constitution... does not require that Congress elect one par-
ticular mechanism from among many possible methods of estab-
lishing paternity."'68 Disputing the majority's assertion, the dissent
emphasized that the rigors of heightened scrutiny demanded more
serious consideration of proposed alternatives. '69 Even assuming the
constitutional "importance" of the asserted interest in providing the
"opportunity" for a father-child relationship, the necessary con-
stitutional fit between the statutory means and the ends was not
achieved. 7 ° "[A]vailable sex-neutral alternatives would at least repli-
cate, and could easily exceed" the success of a statute directed only
at unwed fathers.' 7 ' For example, if the mother's presence at birth
is held out as a sufficient basis for the mother's "opportunity" for
parent-child relationship to develop, then the father's presence at
birth also could be recognized as a sex-neutral alternative to the stat-
utory requirements.'72 Alternatively, both parents could be required
to show "some degree of regular contact" with the child which would
not only satisfy the opportunity rationale but prove the existence of
an actual relationship. 7 '
164. No one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful application of
this Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifi-
cations. Today's decision instead represents a deviation from a line of cases
in which we have vigilantly applied heightened scrutiny to such classifi-
cations to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred.
Id. at 97.
165. INA § 309(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(1) (West 2006).
166. INA § 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(4) (West 2006) (requiring that while the child
is under eighteen, the child is legitimated, the father acknowledges paternity in writing
under oath, or paternity is established by court adjudication).
167. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. The state interest in providing an "opportunity" for a relationship can also be criti-
cized as a post hoc interest contrived by the majority which could be better tailored to the
statute than the interest in developing an actual relationship which was offered by the
government in defense of the statute. For further criticism of the majority's "simulta-
neously watered-down and beefed-up version" of the government interest see id. at 84-89.
171. Id. at 86.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 88.
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IV. THE FAILED PERSPECTIVE OF INHERITANCE
A. The Anomalous Heir Perspective of Gender and Legitimacy
The political and methodological differences surrounding the
misapplication of gender and legitimacy is further complicated by
a failure in perspective in the inheritance context. Attacks on inheri-
tance disparities turning either on gender or legitimacy are brought
by the beneficiary who believes he is being denied money that is
rightfully his.'74 But who is truly the injured party? The beneficiary
or the decedent? A person is generally free to devise his estate in
any manner he wishes upon his death. The intestate provisions effec-
tively operate as a "statutory will,' 1 75 attempting to imitate how the
decedent would have distributed his property if he had left a valid
will.'76 As one court has noted, "[t]he purpose of the statutes of de-
scent and distribution is to make such a will for an intestate as he
would have been most likely to make for himself."'77 Consequently,
whether an estate is distributed pursuant to a valid will or a state's
intestate scheme, it is the decedent, not the surviving devisees or
heirs, whose interests need to be safeguarded.
B. Reorienting Toward the Decedent
Apart from the gender and legitimacy challenges brought against
intestate schemes, the Supreme Court recognizes that existing con-
stitutional rights of devise and descent belong to the decedent."'7 In
Hodel v. Irving, the heirs and devisees could only establish standing
to challenge the federal limitation on a Native American Indian's
ability to distribute his territorial lands by devise and descent as
third parties representing the decedents' interests. 179 The survivors'
effort to establish standing based on claimed violation of their own
interests was soundly rejected at all judicial levels. 8 °
174. See Part II (discussing legal challenges to state inheritance schemes).
175. "The general policy is to follow the lead of the natural affections and to consider
as most worthy the claims of those who stand nearest to the affection of the intestate."
In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W. 2d 714, 717 (Minn. 1970) (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 2D
Descent and Distribution § 10).
176. Intestacy thus becomes a " posthumous legislative second-guessing game." Hill,
No-Fault Death, supra note 39, at 340.
177. Barron v. Janney, 170 A.2d 176, 180 (1961); see also, Pakarinen, 178 N.W. at 717.
178. See infra notes179-83.
179. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987).
180. Id. at 710.
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Similarly, when a decedent has devised his estate pursuant to a
will, interested beneficiaries have little success in raising their own
perceived constitutional injuries. For example, in Shapira v. Union
National Bank the testator instructed that his son should only be
entitled to his estate if he was married to a Jewish girl by the time
of the testator's death or within seven years thereafter.'81 The son
argued that the court's reliance on such provision in the distribution
of his father's estate amounted to state action which violated his
constitutional right to marry. s2 Rejecting the son's constitutional
argument, Shapira emphasized: "the right to receive property by will
is a creature of the law .... It is a fundamental rule of law ... that
a testator may legally entirely disinherit his children. This would
seem to demonstrate that, from a constitutional standpoint, a tes-
tator may restrict a child's inheritance. ' 'l"
Based on Shapira, one might distinguish a discriminatory tes-
tamentary provision from a discriminatory intestate scheme given
the clear legislative role in enacting the disputed intestate statute.
However, consistency with traditional principles of probate demand
that any challenge to a state drawn intestate scheme be brought on
behalf of the decedent.
V. RIGHTING THE MISAPPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
A. A Twofold Prescription
The right of intestacy belongs to a decedent, not to his or her
heirs. Yet in righting the misapplication of equal protection, chang-
ing to a decedent's perspective must be done in combination with
correcting the inconsistent use of gender and legitimacy. Gender
and legitimacy claims must both be entertained, whether inheri-
tance challenges are brought on behalf of deceased children or
deceased fathers.
181. Shapira v. Union National Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28, 29 (1974).
182. Id. at 29-30. In support of his fundamental right to marry as protected under the
constitutional right of privacy, the son relied on such cases as Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942)). In support of the probate court distribution amounting to state action,
the son relied on Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
183. Id. at 32. Dismissing the son's analogy to the state action recognized in Shelley
when a court was asked to enforce of racially restrictive covenants privately drawn
between neighbors, Shapira held that the son was free, at least legally, to marry
whomever he pleased. Id. at 31. In the event he married a Jewish girl, he would receive
the estate. If he married a non-Jewish girl (or no one at all), he would not. Id.
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As the comparison of Miller v. Albrightl" and Nguyen v. IN.S."
reflects, the Supreme Court has not wholeheartedly embraced allow-
ing children to raise gender claims against state action directed at
their parents.'86 While Miller v. Albright splintered on the constitu-
tional treatment of gender, seven Supreme Court justices either
relied upon or did not oppose the use of gender to review the equal
protection challenge brought by a child born against an immigration
statute distinguishing between the citizenship privileges of children
born to United States citizen men and United States citizen women.'87
Perhaps any residual resistance to a child's use of gender can be over-
come by highlighting the risk of inconsistency in allowing gender to
be raised on behalf of fathers raising inheritance challenges but
restricting children to raise legitimacy claims despite identical in-
heritance interests. 88 Such risk is particularly significant given
the "exceedingly persuasive" '89 government interest standard now
required for gender and the traditional "important"'9 government
interest maintained for legitimacy. 9 '
Dual testing based upon gender and legitimacy would also allow
for all of the state interests to be fully evaluated in each case. Dif-
ferent state interests are raised in the legitimacy context than in the
gender context. When inheritance statutes are challenged on the
basis of legitimacy, the state interests typically concern the efficient
administration of the decedent's estate and the related problem of
preventing fraudulent paternity claims.'92 By contrast, the gender
184. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
185. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
186. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text (comparing the Court's limited
reliance upon gender in Miller v. Albright to review a federal restriction of citizenship to
an unwed child of a United States citizen father and the Court's unanimous use of gender
in Nguyen v. I.N.S. to review the identical statute when the challenge was brought by an
unwed father).
187. Fo'r justices and the Chief Justice relied directly upon gender. Miller v. Albright,
523 U.S. 420, 445,460-61,470-71,482-88 (1998) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J, joined by
Rehnquist, Chief Justice, dissenting opinions of Ginsburg, joined by Souter and Breyer,
and dissenting opinion of Breyer, joined by Ginsburg and Souter, respectively). Of the
remaining four justices, only two directly opposed a child's use of gender distinctions
drawn between his parents. Id. at 445-46 (concurring opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by
Kennedy, J.). Deciding Miller as a political immigration matter outside the scope of
judicial review, the remaining two justices simply did not address the viability of the
indirect use of gender by a child. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring joined by Thomas, J.).
For further discussions of Miller and the use of gender or legitimacy in such case see
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
188. For discussion of such inconsistent treatment see supra notes 104-08 and accom-
panying text.
189. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
190. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
191. For further discussion of applying such differences between gender and legitimacy
to evaluate similar inheritance interests see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
192. For a recognition of the State interests of efficient administration and establishing
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distinctions are typically reviewed against a state interest in encour-
aging fathers to support and care for their children.'93 This type of
division is arbitrary. State interests in developing familial relation-
ships and preventing fraudulent claims may often both be credibly
raised, regardless of whether the case turns on legitimacy or gender.
B. The Limits of the Prescription
Shifting to a decedent's perspective and allowing gender and
legitimacy to be fully evaluated in the cases of parents and children
will not prevent the political disparaging of unwed fathers. If the
bias is to be judicially addressed, it must first be recognized. Similarly,
the arbitrary choice in equal protection claims between the 'least
restrictive means" or the "within constitutional limits" standard is
not a distinction that can be corrected by a shift to the decedent's
perspective or a combined application of gender and legitimacy. The
lack of uniformity on this matter extends beyond equal protection
challenges into the inheritance context. 194 Raising the inconsistency
will hopefully bring attention to another constitutional dilemma that
must be resolved as a matter of judicial integrity.
VI. APPLYING THE PRESCRIPTION
If constitutional challenges to intestate statutes were consis-
tently evaluated from the decedent's perspective, how would the
review improve? Could the application of gender and legitimacy be
more systematic? Imagine the following scenarios.
paternity in cases challenging the inheritance rights of either fathers or children on the
basis of legitimacy see, for example, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (evaluating
such interests and upholding inheritance rights of illegitimate children unless paternity
is established during a father's lifetime via judicial order); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347, 357-58 (1979) (evaluating such interests and upholding a statute denying a father's
wrongful death benefits absent his voluntary establishment of paternity). But see Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-71 (1977) (striking down an absolute bar of inheritance rights
of illegitimate children after evaluating both the state interest in establishing paternity
and "promoti[ng] of legitimate family relationships," but recognizing the state interest
in establishing paternity to be a "more substantial justification." Id. at 770. The Court
did not believe punishing children for parents' out-of-wedlock relationships would dis-
courage such relationships); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998) (denying
illegitimate daughterjus sanguinis citizenship upon recognition of state interest in valid
relationships and to prevent false paternity claims).
193. See, e.g., Rainey v. Chever, 270 Ga. 519, 520 (1999); Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S.
1044, 1044 (Thomas J., dissenting). State interest in father-child relationships is also
asserted as the basis for gender disparities in the immigration context. See, e.g., Nguyen
v. I.N.S, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001).
194. See supra notes 138-57 and accompanying text (discussing inheritance and non-
inheritance cases raising gender and legitimacy interests in which the variation between
"least restrictive means" and "within constitutional limits" exists).
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A. The Decedent-Child's Perspective: A Right to Gender and
Legitimacy
Consider an intestate statute, which requires an unwed father
to openly treat and support his child in order to qualify as an heir. 195
Consider also the facts of Rainey v. Chever on which Georgia struck
down its version of such a provision. 9 ' Now assume that rather than
recognizing the standing of a surviving, unwed father, any constitu-
tional challenge to a state's inheritance scheme could only be brought
on behalf of the deceased child.'97
Given the relationship of Robert Lee Chever with his son,
DeAndre, it is unlikely that in this particular case a challenge against
the gender-based intestate provision would have ever been raised on
behalf of the decedent-child.' Mr. Chever was no model father.
Although his son lived less than one mile away, he never made any
contact with him. Mr. Chever never legitimated his son, initiated
any visits with him, or showed any interest in his development. He
met his son one time, when DeAndre (at the age of fifteen) confronted
him along with other children Mr. Chever had fathered. Yet, when
DeAndre died along with others in a automobile crash, Chever was
the first parent to file for monetary damages.1
99
Who would argue that the DeAndre's interests would be best pro-
tected by requiring some portion of his estate be provided to his way-
ward father? From the perspective of the decedent-child in Rainey, the
former Georgia statute got it absolutely right. Deadbeat dads should
not collect.2 °° Does that mean, however, that absent consideration
195. For a discussion of the states which maintain such requirements see supra note
25 and accompanying text.
196. Rainey, 527 at 1044 (denying certiorari without opinion). For further discussion
of Rainey see supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
197. This rule would allow a father denied inheritance to raise a claim on behalf of the
decedent, but only as a representative of the child's interests. Additionally, an individual
named administrator of a child's intestate estate could also represent the child/decedent
and raise constitutional challenges on the child's behalf. Both third party possibilities
were recognized in Hodel v. Hodel. 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987).
198. The child's full name was DeAndre Bernard Hamilton. Rainey, 527 U.S. at 1044
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In the Rainey suit, the child's mother, Zenobia Hamilton Rainey
was the named petitioner. Id.
199. Id. at 1044-45 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. Likewise, "deadbeat moms" should also not be entitled to inheritance. For the
author's proposal of a gender neutral approach to support expectations in the parental
inheritance context see infra note 203 and accompanying text.
The author has previously argued in the spousal context that "emotional fault" consid-
erations such as abandonment, desertion and nonsupport (as well as adultery) should
not provide the basis for estate preclusion. Courts should take into consideration factors
such as abandonment and nonsupport in the parent-child context. The dynamics of the
husband-wife relationship are entirely unlike those in the parent-child relationship.
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of the survivor's perspective that a gender-based inheritance prohi-
bition such as Georgia's could withstand all constitutional attacks?
Revisit the same statute with a different set of facts. Assume that
a child is born in wedlock and is abandoned during her lifetime by
her father. A statutory provision directed at unwed, nonsupporting
fathers does not prevent the married, wayward father from inherit-
ing. In this instance, the critical distinction is legitimacy.
If we accept that a decedent would not want to provide for a
parent who has abandoned her regardless of marital status, the stat-
ute irrationally distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate
children. The statute fails its purported purpose of encouraging true
familial relationships."1 A married man can abandon his child and
still be rewarded. It also fails the decedent's interests as it is unlikely
that an abandoned child would want to reward her wayward father,
regardless of his 'legitimate" relationship with his daughter.
Now assume another set of facts. Assume that a child born out-of-
wedlock dies and that child has not been supported by her mother.
Given a statute only directed at unwed, nonsupporting fathers, the
mother will still qualify for an intestate share. Again, the statute
works against interests. Recognizing a state interest in actualizing
the "presumed desires" of a decedent who dies intestate and en-
couraging familial relationships,0 2 it is difficult to find that a statute
that distinguishes based upon gender meets a standard of height-
ened scrutiny.
Working through such additional fact patterns demonstrates that
rather than relying on the unsympathetic Mr. Chever, a case could
certainly be imagined based upon the decedent-child's perspective
in which an intestate provision directed only at unwed, nonsupport-
ing fathers could still be struck. There seems no support for a statute
which allows for any nonsupporting parent to inherit. By allowing
both legitimacy and gender claims to be raised on behalf of a deceased
child, such findings can be legally recognized.
The parent-child relationship is inherently rooted in notions of nurture and support.
Moreover, unlike parents and children, husband and wives are increasingly viewed as
equals who are each capable of protecting their individual interests. For the author's
proposal against the use of "emotional fault" in the spousal context see Linda Kelly Hill,
No-Fault Death: Wedding Inheritance Rights to Family Values, 94 KY. L. REV. 320
(2005).
201. For a recognition of such state interests in cases involving gender see supra note
185.
202. In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Minn. 1970) (recognizing the
state interest in protecting decedents as a basis for rejecting an illegitimate child's
constitutional challenge to a statute precluding inheritance unless the father had affir-
matively acknowledged the child in writing during his lifetime).
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Reflecting an effort to respect the decedent-child's desires, states
may easily condition parental inheritance upon support, regardless
of gender and legitimacy. Fourteen states have adopted such a
position. °3 Their intestate provisions model the current version of
the UPC which mandates, "Inheritance from or through a child by
either natural parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that
natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has
not refused to support the child."2"
B. The Decedent-Father's Perspective: A Return to Filius Nullius?
In the evaluation of intestate statutes drawn to limit a non-
marital child's distribution, an effort to evaluate the perspective of
the deceased father was short-lived. In Trimble v. Gordon, the Court
recognized that intestate succession laws are intended to reflect "the
natural affinities of decedents. '2 5 Yet Trimble ultimately determined
that such intestacy laws are "more convincingly explained" by efforts
to act "more just to illegitimate children" and to prevent "spurious
claims of paternity." ' 6 However, if the decedent's desires are the
basic rationale behind intestate succession laws, why not seriously
evaluate whether a man would want to distinguish in the treatment
of his legitimate and illegitimate children at the time of his death?
Put in such explicit terms, consideration of the decedent's per-
spective may be regarded as nothing more than a distasteful revival
of filius nullius; an effort to protect men from the claims of children
they would prefer not to recognize or support.2 7 Yet would an eval-
uation from an out-of-wedlock father's perspective always reflect
such unworthy objectives?
Imagine the case of a child born out-of-wedlock who is twenty-one
at the time of his father's death. Assume further that although the
father and child had a relationship in fact, it was not formally recog-
nized during the prescribed period. Absent such legal recognition of
paternity, a child may not be entitled to an intestate distribution of
203. For identification of the fourteen states adopting such types of provisions see
supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
204. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (1990).
205. 430 U.S. 762, 775 (1977).
206. Id.
207. At least one critic perceives laws continuing to draw any distinction between
illegitimate and legitimate children for the purpose of intestate succession as well as
wrongful death, domicile, adoption, and citizenship rights as exemplifying the persis-
tence of male coverture, to the extent women are treated as subordinate to men in the con-
text of unmarried families. Davis, supra note 55, at 79-80. For further discussion of filius
nullius and the related theory of coverture see supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
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his father's estate. °" Yet while the child is being statutorily prevented
from receiving a portion of his father's estate, could not it be argued
that a father in these circumstances would want his child to inherit,
despite not establishing the legal standard of paternity prior to death?
Furthermore, should not these very valid interests of the decedent
be evaluated alongside the traditionally raised state interests in effi-
cient estate administration and prevention of fraudulent paternity
claims when a constitutional challenge to such statutes is made?2"9
To assume that all fathers of nonmarital children believe that their in-
terests are best protected by preventing the inheritance of such chil-
dren is to otherwise accept the biases of gender and legitimacy.2 10
When a parent dies, recognition of a valid parent-child relation-
ship should not turn on gender or legitimacy but rather on the parent's
knowledge of the child's existence and relationship. Knowledge of
the existence of one's child should be sufficient to assume that the
decedent-parent's "presumed desires" are that such child should re-
ceive an intestate share.21'
Absent advanced technology or a well-written soap opera story-
line, a woman's knowledge that she has a child is readily apparent
upon the child's birth.212 Standards for establishing paternity should
mirror this knowledge. Prior to a man's death, knowledge is estab-
lished by such circumstances as marriage, adoption, or voluntary ac-
knowledgment of paternity or its legal adjudication.213 As most states
readily acknowledge, there should also be a basis for establishing
paternity after the father's death.214 Yet such posthumous standards
must recognize the perspective of the decedent-father and his knowl-
edge of paternity. This dual emphasis lends support for "clear and
convincing" evidence not simply to establish paternity but also to
establish the father's knowledge of such.2 15 California's paternity
statute beautifully illustrates such dual emphasis. In addition to
208. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7(b)(1) (West 2006) (requiring paternity be es-
tablished by a legal cause of action prior to the death of the decedent when the deceased
man is survived by a child who is over twenty years of age and was born out-of-wedlock).
209. For recognition of such interests of efficient administration and proving paternity
see supra note 204.
210. For a recognition of the ongoing acceptance of such biases see supra notes 118-37
and accompanying text.
211. In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W. 2d 714, 717 (Minn. 1970).
212. Consequently a mother relationship to her child is typically recognized regardless
of her marital status at the time of birth. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508 (2006).
213. For a review of the states' means of establishing paternity before the father's
death see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
214. For a review of the states' means of establishing paternity after the father's death
see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
215. For a review of the states' use of the clear and convincing standard in establish-
ing paternity after the father's death see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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recognizing that paternity may be established during the father's
lifetime,216 it allows for paternity to be established after the father's
death only by showing "clear and convincing evidence that the father
has openly held out the child as his own 7 or upon showing that "it
was impossible for the father to hold out the child as his own and pa-
ternity is established by clear and convincing evidence."21 Allowing
an exception to knowledge only in the limited instance of"impossibil-
ity" is consistent with an effort to protect the decedent's "presumed
desires '219 through state intestate schemes. Contrary to the negative
image of a bastard's father, we are left with the positive image of a
benevolent, unwed father.22 Had he known his child to exist, he would
have wanted his child to inherit.
CONCLUSION
Inheritance is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property. ' When a
person dies without a valid will or certain property has not or can
not be devised, the State must create a default plan to distribute the
decedent's property. Yet while the State creates the intestate scheme,
the right of inheritance remains with the decedent. Such right is not
altered by one's familial position. The inheritance rights of unwed
fathers and their children need to be afforded the same constitutional
safeguards provided to all others. In accordance with equal protection,
a State may create different, but constitutionally sound, evidentiary
standards to prove the relationship between an unwed father and
his child. States can also legitimately debate whether all parents,
regardless of gender or marital status, should be held to a support
standard in order to inherit from or through a deceased child. Such
requirements can be established consistently with a decedent's in-
terests. In so doing, equal protection will be properly applied, and
the rights of inheritance will be affirmed.
216. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(1) (2006).
217. Id. § 6453(b)(2).
218. Id. § 6453(b)(3).
219. In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 N.W. 2d 714, 718 (Minn., 1970).
220. The author has previously used the terms "republican mothers" and "bastards'
fathers" to contrast and emphasize the effect of the positive images of unwed mothers
and the negative images of unwed fathers. Kelly, Republican Mothers, supra note 92.
221. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
